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Research Question
 This paper provides a better answer than I gave at the time to a 
question I was asked after a presentation to last year’s NPS 
Acquisition Research Symposium.*
 My presentation concerned a model that related cost growth on 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) to a proxy for the 
intensity of competition for funding at Milestone (MS) B, changes in 
acquisition policy, and measures of program duration.  
 The question asked was: Why had I not included as explanatory 
variables any program characteristics—for example, the degree of 
concurrency between Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) and procurement? 
 On reflection, I decided I had not thought through the issue 
completely. This paper presents my efforts to do so.
* David L. McNicol, “Further Evidence on Program Duration and Unit Cost Growth,” in Vol. I of 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, April 30, 2018), 89–105.
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Overview of the Paper
There are five parts to the paper’s argument:
1. The Program Characteristics Model (PCM)
2. The Funding Climate-Acquisition Policy Model (FC-APM)
3. Specification of an expanded model of cost growth
4. Demonstration that with the context of the more complete model, 
the FC-APM is, in a sense, the same PCM
5. Conclusions
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The emphasis in the brief is placed on features of the acquisition 
process and decisions that get made, not the formalisms introduced.
1. The Program Characteristics Model
 The label “Program Characteristics Model” is just a handy name for a 
widely accepted presumption: that a major cause of cost growth in 
MDAPs is unrealistic elements in the MS B baseline; e.g., an 
unrealistic EMD schedule, immature critical technologies, etc.
 The application of this idea has mainly come in case studies.
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ChPAUC : Change in Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC)
CMSB : MS B baseline value of PAUC 
X1 , … , Xn : Deviations of program characteristics from realistic or 
nominal values
h( •) : Function that relates deviations of program characteristics 
from realistic or nominal values to unit cost growth
2.  The Funding Climate-Acquisition Policy Model
 The FC-APM was developed in a series of papers published over 
2014–2018. Where the PCM is about proximate causes of cost 
growth, the FC-APM is situated upstream—it is closer to an analysis 
of root causes.
 The FC-APM starts with this question: Are there circumstances in 
which DoD is more likely to accept at MS B programs with 
significant unrealistic characteristics?
 The answer is: “Yes”—during bust budget climates; that is, during 
periods when the competition for funding for MDAPs is particularly 
intense. The “proof” of this conclusion is statistical.
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W: Measure of the intensity of competition for acquisition funds
R: Vector of restrictions (that is, acquisition policies) that the PM believes 
must be observed 
3. A More Comprehensive Model of Cost Growth
 The more comprehensive model adds to the PCM representations 
of two decisions. Both are made by the Program Manager (PM) or, 
more realistically, by the PM and his seniors.
 The context of the model is decisions made at the Service level 
during the year leading up to MS B.
 First, the PM must decide how low the cost of the program must be 
to gain funding in the prevailing funding climate. The cost that the 
PM decides is needed is denoted by C*.
5
C* = f(W, R)
 Second, the PM must decide what elements of the program to alter to
get the cost down to the required level.
xi* = gi(C*, R), i = 1,…, n .
4. Derivation of the Reduced Form Model
 A reduced form of a system of equations is the solution giving each 
of the endogenous variables in terms of the exogenous variables.
 The endogenous variables of the model are C*, the xi* , and ChPAUC.
 The reduced forms are found by substituting from top to bottom.  
The reduced form for ChPAUC is:
 The PCM and the FC-APM do not embody different theories of cost 
growth; the FC-APM is the reduced form of the PCM (given the 
model specified.)
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1.  C* = f(W, R)
2.  xi* = gi(C*, R), i = 1,…, n
5. Conclusions
 The question that motivated this paper was: Why not include 
program characteristics as variables in the FC-APM?
 A technical answer is that doing so contradicts the specification of 
the comprehensive model behind the FC-APM. 
 A better answer is that including program characteristics in an
FC-APM would answer no question. 
 Studies that employ the PCM of cost growth are intended to provide 
good housekeeping guidance on how to structure MDAPs. 
 FC-APM is concerned with explaining why DoD does not always follow 
the dictates of policy and prudence in laying out major acquisition 
programs.
 Including program characteristics in an FC-APM model would produce 
results that, regardless of the estimated test statistics, cannot be 





Estimated Coefficients for a Model that Includes 
the Boom Effect and Program Duration
9
PAUCi = a0 + a1Climatei + a2DSARCi + a3PCDSARCi + a4DABi + 
+ a5ARi + a6Tboom,i + a7Tbust,i + ei
Coefficients p-value
Intercept 73.1%*** < 0.001
Errors of Inception—Intensity of Competition for Funds
Funding Climate -28.7%*** 0.009
Errors of Inception—Acquisition Policy
DSARC -56.7%*** < 0.001
PC DSARC -50.3%*** 0.001
DAB -59.5%*** < 0.001
AR -80.2%*** < 0.001
Errors of Execution and Program Changes
Tboom 3.8%/yr** 0.021
Tbust 0.59%/yr 0.515
*** Statistically significant at less than the 1 percent level.
** Statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level.
R-Squared = 0.26, F = 7.02 (P < 0.001), N= 149. Estimated using OLS. Four programs that passed 
through two boom periods and the three mid-1980s MDAPs acquired using TPP-like contracts 
were omitted. Wald’s test for the equality of the estimated coefficients of the categorical variables 
for acquisition policy periods with the Bonferroni correction yields F= 1.43, p = 0.0.946.
